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The contribution of social sciences to risk assessment has often been 
confined to dimensions of risk perception and communication. This 
article relates an effort to promote knowledge from the social 
sciences that addresses other dimensions of risk issues. A 
sociological checklist produced for ANSES in France helps to 
identify and analyse social dimensions that should be given attention 
during the process of risk assessment. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The contribution of social sciences to risk analysis can be traced to 
the 1970s. As different disciplines from the natural sciences strived 
to establish a rigorous method to define the existence, probability and 
amplitude of risks related to nuclear energy or chemicals in the 
environment or the workplace, (psycho) sociologists undertook in 
parallel to study differences in risk perceptions between experts and 
the lay public. They concluded that risks were mental constructs, not 
objective facts, whose definition rested on the use of different frames 
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of reference. The identification of the factors shaping the public’s 
perception of risks led to the development of the subfield of risk 
communication, designed to reduce the gap between lay and expert 
perceptions and help policymakers address the legitimate concerns of 
the general public when managing risks1. 
The wealth of studies dedicated to risk perception, amplification and 
communication since the 1970s is a testimony to the importance of 
this field of research. Whilst initially considered outside the process 
of risk assessment and management as codified by the NRC in its 
1983 Red Book, risk perception and communication were taken into 
account during the 1990s. Progressively, societal concerns were 
considered important enough to warrant the development of various 
models. In the most recent, IRGC’s risk governance framework 
(2008), social sciences are integrated in each of the four stages (pre-
assessment, risk appraisal, tolerability and acceptability judgment, 
and risk management)2. The journal Risk Analysis also testifies to the 
importance of social science knowledge in governing risks. 
Yet, for all their efforts to bring in societal concerns in the process of 
risk analysis, these models fail to question the separation between 
science and society. This can be traced back to the initial assumption 
that the public’s perceptions differ from those of experts, although 
risk perception scholars insisted that both were equally valid. With 
the multiplication of health and environmental crises, scandals and 
controversies during the 1990s in Europe, policymakers acknow-
ledged that societal concerns should be taken into consideration 
along with scientific input in managing risks – but separately. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!Paul Slovic, The perception of risk (London: Earthscan, 2000). 
2 IRGC, An introduction to the IRGC risk governance framework (Geneva: 2008). 
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Accordingly, independent agencies were set up on the basis of a clear 
separation between risk assessment (domain of the natural sciences) 
and risk management (where social sciences could be called upon). 
These agencies never considered the possibility that social sciences 
might contribute to the characterization of dangers or the definition 
of risks. In the minds of their promoters, social sciences were only 
required once the risk had been established, in order to help 
communicate the findings to the general public and come up with 
acceptable decisions.  
This separation has come under strong criticism from sociologists, 
anthropologists and political scientists, who have shown that the 
boundary between science and society is a social construct, designed 
to delineate a special area of expertise and competence for scientists, 
leaving the rest to “politics”3. But in a context of reiterated scandals 
and mounting social contention, public authorities have also come to 
realize that sole reliance on scientific expertise to manage risks, in 
particular when issues are uncertain, complex and ambiguous4, is 
politically hazardous. Accordingly, initiatives have been taken to 
introduce social sciences in the process of risk analysis. These have 
taken different forms, from the recruitment of social scientists and 
the creation of dedicated services, to the participation of social 
scientists in expert committees, agency boards and the production of 
expert advice. So far, these initiatives have produced mixed results – 
in part because the evidence they provide is not well adapted to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3  Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers 
through Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987). Sheila 
Jasanoff, “Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science”, 17-2 Social Studies 
of Science (1987), pp. 195 et sqq. 
4 Ortwin Renn, Risk governance: coping with uncertainty in a complex world 
(London: Earthscan, 2008). 
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dominant forms of knowledge (and their epistemologies and methods 
of validation) used in traditional risk analysis. 
This mismatch has spurred efforts to adapt social science knowledge 
to the assessment of risk issues. Among these have emerged 
sociological checklists or guides that aim to introduce a more 
analytic approach, anchored in academic knowledge but oriented 
towards pragmatic uses. In the Netherlands, the National Institute for 
Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) supported in 2003 the 
elaboration of a questionnaire destined to explicit various forms of 
« uncertainty ». This checklist mentioned topics such as problem fra-
ming, stakeholder involvement or uncertainties based on knowledge5. 
In France, the Haute Autorité de Santé (HAS) supported in 2009 the 
conception of a sociological checklist for its own staff when as-
sessing health technologies6. In 2011, the French Institut de Veille 
Sanitaire (InVS) published a guide to help its agents assess the social 
context when investigating a local environmental health risk alert7. 
In contrast with other possible uses of social sciences, these 
checklists help to identify dimensions of risk-related issues that 
contribute to their social dynamic and thus require the contribution of 
social sciences. They can facilitate the reference to social dimensions 
that are meaningful for institutional actors, social scientists and other 
experts alike. The identification of relevant social dimensions can 
help to delineate what is at stake when examining a specific topic. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Jeroen van der Sluijs et al., RIVM/MNP guidance for uncertainty assessment and 
communication: tool catalogue for uncertainty assessment (Utrecht/Bilthoven : 
Copernicus Institute & RIVM, 2004). 
6 Daniel Benamouzig, “L’évaluation des aspects sociaux en santé”, 1-2 Revue 
Française des Affaires Sociales (2010), pp. 187 et sqq. 
7  InVS et Risques et Intelligence, Approche du contexte social lors d’un 
signalement local en santé et environnement (Paris : InVS, 2011).!
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Lastly, the dimensions structuring the checklist refer to methods, 
concepts and questions that are state of the art in the social sciences. 
By specifying the social dimensions scrutinised in the process of 
expertise, and by defining the type of knowledge available to analyse 
them, social sciences can be introduced more usefully in risk 
assessment. 
However, designing such a checklist requires a number of 
adjustments between social sciences and the institutional context in 
which they will be used. This article presents the experience of the 
French Agence Nationale de Sécurité Sanitaire (ANSES). In 2011, 
ANSES supported the conception of a sociological checklist on risk 
assessment and health safety. This paper will provide the checklist, 
describing its conception and presenting its contents. Our aim is to 
spur a discussion amongst risk professionals (academic and non-
academic alike) regarding the usefulness of such a checklist and how 
it could be adapted to other institutional contexts. Our wish is that a 
checklist such as the one used by ANSES will pave the way to a 
renewed participation of social sciences to the evaluation of risk 
issues. 
 
II. Methodology 
ANSES was founded in 2010, following the merger of the French 
food safety agency (AFSSA) with the environmental and 
occupational health and safety agency (AFSSET). It currently 
employs approximately 1350 agents, operates 11 research 
laboratories, and runs 16 experts committees and 14 working groups 
involving 800 outside experts. It covers a wide range of issues in 
human, plant and animal health. Acting under the supervision of five 
ministries (Health, Environment, Agriculture, Labour, and Consumer 
Affairs), its work is organized around questions (saisines or referrals 
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in French administrative jargon) that are addressed by ministries, 
NGOs or its own direction.  
Whilst the former AFSSA had not shown a particular interest in the 
contribution of social sciences, save on consumer behaviour, 
AFSSET had from the outset mobilized social scientists to help 
assess referrals on highly controversial issues, namely mobile 
telephony. When ANSES was created, this openness toward social 
sciences was maintained, since the agency would have to take on 
highly sensitive issues that could potentially endanger its reputation. 
A special Social science unit was then created within the department 
of communication. Stakeholders were closely associated to the 
agency operations with the help of a sociologist. A social scientist 
was appointed to the scientific council of ANSES. An early warning 
system was installed with the help of a team of sociologists. Finally, 
a growing number of social scientists joined expert committees. Yet 
as suggested above, this did not always produce a significant impact. 
Accordingly, the Social science unit asked the Center for the 
Sociology of Organizations (CSO) to devise a checklist that agency 
staff and experts alike could use and share when assessing risk 
issues. CSO had organized with AFSSET a conference on 
“Governing Uncertainty”, which had demonstrated the wealth of 
social science studies available in the fields of environmental and 
occupational health and safety8. CSO, a joint CNRS-SciencesPo 
research unit that employs both sociologists and political scientists, is 
specialized in the study of organizations, public policies, markets and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 AFSSET, Governing uncertainty: the contribution of social sciences to the 
governance of risks in environmental health, International conference, Paris, 6-7 
July 2009: 
http://www.afsset.fr/upload/bibliotheque/935409038664891455468866124930/gov
erning_uncertainty_en.pdf  
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professions. On issues of risk and health, it has produced extensive 
research over the last 15 years.  
The collaboration between ANSES and CSO resulted in two 
productions. First, CSO undertook a comparative study on the use of 
social sciences by European and North American agencies. Second, 
CSO conceived and tested a sociological checklist for the purpose of 
ANSES. The latter required an ad hoc and pragmatic approach: 
ANSES demanded a tool adapted to its specific needs, i.e. not a 
generic instrument, and easy to use by agents with no training in the 
social sciences. This implied a close collaboration with the agency in 
order to devise the checklist.  
The elaboration of the list of questions composing the checklist 
proceeded in four phases. 
1. An initial set of questions was established.  The questions were 
listed under six headings – or sociological dimensions: 1) political 
and institutional context; 2) socioeconomic context; 3) forms of 
knowledge; 4) public arena; 5) social stratifications and inequalities; 
6) scales of intervention (from local to global). These dimensions 
helped circumscribe the social dynamics underlying risk issues. This 
set of question was based on a previous sociological checklist 
devised in 2009 by one of the authors for HAS (Haute Autorité de 
Santé), a leading institution in the field of health in France9. The 
HAS checklist, produced by a group of sociologists, political 
scientists, anthropologists, economists and public health profes-
sionals, was destined for health technology assessments. The 
checklist for ANSES thus required an adaptation of the checklist to 
its specific needs and fields of intervention. Initial considerations 
regarding patients, for instance, were widened to cover the topic of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Daniel Benamouzig, art. cit., (2010). 
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public arenas. A heading relative to forms of knowledge was added 
in order to take into consideration the heterogeneity of data 
mobilized by the different actors when establishing relationships 
between health and the environment. The addition of a dimension on 
scales of intervention was justified on the grounds that health and 
environmental concerns often fall within the remit of different public 
authorities.  
2. After discussions with agency staff, four fields were identified to 
test the questionnaire. The fields were meant to be representative of 
the different activities of the agency, both in terms of topics, and 
units or services. The fields chosen were: 1) animal health; 2) 
nanomaterials; 3) nutrition; 4) occupational exposure to pesticides. In 
each of these, a small number of agents were interviewed. The 
questionnaire covered both a description of the unit or service’s 
activities, the types of referrals they dealt with, the social actors they 
interacted with (professional groups, private firms, state services, 
scientists, etc.) and the problems they attributed to “social” 
phenomena (e.g. public acceptance, role of the media, litigation, 
etc.).  
3. Workshops by field were organized with agency staff and experts. 
Prior to each workshop, one or two referral(s) were examined in light 
of the six dimensions by the CSO team. The analysis was then 
presented to the workshop participants and their reactions discussed: 
did they consider the analysis of social dimensions inherent to the 
risk issue relevant and useful, or not? Did they believe such an 
analysis added something to both the understanding of the case and 
the final report, or not? Did they feel comfortable with forms of 
knowledge they were not familiar with, or not? Did they believe they 
could answer the sociological questions by themselves, or not?  
LIEPP Working Paper n°21 
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One idea, implicit in the approach, was that agency staff and experts 
already had extensive knowledge of the social dimensions related to 
their domain: they knew the different actors, understood more or less 
their stakes and interests in the matter. But they did not consider this 
knowledge to be neither relevant nor useful when assessing the 
referral; or if they did, had no method to make this knowledge valid 
in their report. Hence, the goal was to suggest that answering the 
questions listed in the checklist did not systematically require a full 
sociological analysis; in fact, in most cases the knowledge was there 
and just needed to be recognized and formatted in such a way as to 
help staff and experts answer properly the question addressed by the 
ministries or NGOs. In some cases, though, answering the questions 
could reveal the need for additional research, which could be 
delegated either to the Social science unit or external social 
scientists: but this would have to prove to be useful for the end result, 
and not just be research for its own sake. The end result being a 
report that both answers the questions listed in the referral and takes 
into account the different publics who will use the report. Indeed, an 
indicator of success for the reports produced by ANSES lies in their 
capacity to address the concerns of different stakeholders: to achieve 
this, it is important that they be identified as early on as possible.  
4. Based on the data collected during the interviews and the 
workshop, a final list of questions was established. The number of 
headings remained the same, but they evolved in order to take into 
account lessons learned during the second and third phases. In 
particular, the question of scales was dropped as it rarely came up as 
a relevant topic in discussions. Meanwhile, the construction of public 
problem was added as this seemed distinct from the dimension of 
institutional context and required a specific reflection. The six 
dimensions of the final checklist are the issues’: 1) institutional 
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context; 2) socioeconomic context; 3) social practices and context; 4) 
problem construction; 5) forms of knowledge; 6) social inequalities. 
The questions within each dimension are labelled in such a way as to 
make sense to agents with no particular training in the social 
sciences.  
The questionnaire was supplemented by two other documents. First, 
although concise, the questionnaire with its six dimensions and five 
questions per dimension could still scare off agency staff and experts. 
Accordingly, a list of ten preliminary questions requiring a simple 
yes or no answer was introduced at the beginning of the checklist. 
The first four questions relate to the referral in general and its 
potential for controversy and reputational risk for ANSES; the last 
six refer to the six dimensions of the checklist. A significant number 
of yeses can lead agency staff to decide to fill in the rest of the 
questionnaire. But if most questions end up with a no, or if the 
number of yeses does not seem serious enough to warrant an added 
investment, then the checklist can stop there. However, the 
preliminary set of questions was not conceived as a formal algorithm 
of any kind. In spite of its soft quantitative nature, it should be 
appreciated as a qualitative indicator for the relevance of a more 
comprehensive approach. In any case, what is important is that this 
simple exercise be completed as often as possible when a referral 
comes in: if only to evaluate later on if this proved to be useful or not 
in answering the initial request. 
Second, although the dimensions and their questions are supposed to 
be self-explicit, it was necessary to provide a summarized state of the 
art in the social sciences in each of the six domains. This served two 
purposes. One, demonstrate the relevance of social sciences and 
reveal that behind each dimension there exists a bulk of available 
research that supports stabilized forms of knowledge; research that 
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can be fruitfully mobilized by agency staff and experts. Two, offer 
some rough elements of sociological reasoning, in order to help staff 
and experts understand the logics underlying the questions without 
having received any specific training in the social sciences.  
The next two sections will present the state of the art and then 
provide the checklist.  
 
III. State of the art 
The entire state of the art will not be presented here due to lack of 
space, but its key ideas for each of the six dimensions will be 
summarized. The literature relates to the sociology of organizations, 
institutional theory, economic sociology, social movement theory, 
science and technology studies, interactionism, and cultural theory. 
The aim of the state of the art is to explore the various social 
dimensions underlying risk issues and to supplement risk perception 
and communication approaches focused primarily on the public. 
Institutional context: the different institutions concerned with the 
topic addressed in the referral will need to be mapped out. This 
requires an understanding of their interests and values, along with the 
way they think and act. The difficulty here is that ANSES is itself a 
concerned institution: it is not an actor sitting outside the political 
context, producing science in a neutral fashion with no specific 
interests of its own. ANSES is an actor within the political landscape, 
with an interest in establishing and defending its credibility and 
reputation; and this requires some reflexivity on the part of agency 
staff and experts. Once the different institutions have been mapped 
out, it is necessary to identify the legal frameworks within which 
they operate. This gives an insight on the constraints that the 
institutions face. But social sciences have also taught us that 
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institutions operate along a set of informal rules and practices10. 
These informal rules will produce routines, which need to be 
analysed since the identity of an institution often rests on them. 
Lastly, each institution uses its own cognitive maps, ways of 
understanding and making sense of information it receives11. Hence, 
understanding the institutional context of a referral implies being 
able to account for the way in which the different institutions 
perceive and understand the problem, in terms of their interests and 
values, rules and procedures, routines and modes of interpretation.  
Socioeconomic context: alongside official institutions, a range of 
public, non-governmental or private actors are also involved in 
producing, distributing, marketing, selling, controlling the different 
products that come under the supervision of ANSES. They may be 
private firms, but they can also be professional groups (veterinarians 
or physicians, for instance), or organizations with a surveillance 
function. As with institutions, once they have been mapped out it is 
important to retrace the legal frameworks within which they operate, 
the formal and informal rules they comply with, their routine 
procedures and cognitive maps. It is also important to analyse the 
relations these different actors have with each other, and how these 
contribute (or not) to stabilized systems, forms of cooperation and 
networks. Notions of power will come into play, resulting from the 
uncertainties that some actors control and that others value 12 . !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Jean-Daniel Reynaud, Les règles du jeu. L'action collective et la régulation 
sociale (Paris: Armand Colin, 1997). 
11 Mary Douglas, How institutions think (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1986). 
12 Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedberg, Actors and systems : the politics of 
collective action (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980).!
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Identifying key uncertainties helps to make sense of the relations 
between the different actors, determine those who exercise influence, 
and identify the system within which they operate. One must also 
take into consideration the technologies and forms of knowledge that 
are being used, as these also determine the range of choices actors 
face13. In some cases, strong path dependency can characterize a 
given domain14. In others, recent innovations can increase the level 
of instability15. Finally, crises and accidents also reshape a given 
system of actors, providing new resources or opportunities, defining 
new constraints, thus altering the strategies of the different actors. 
Many risk objects are a result of these complex relations between 
different actors and their respective strategies. 
Social practices and context: the topics that are assessed often refer 
to individual or group behaviours, particularly in terms of exposure 
to a possible danger (either as a consumer or a producer). Yet 
describing, understanding and making sense of these behaviours 
implies putting aside normative judgments in order to see the logic 
behind behaviours that may appear irrational. Often, agency staff and 
experts will rely on general categories – such as age, gender, social 
status or profession. Although useful, this may lead to errors of 
interpretation, linked to the belief that all members of a same 
category behave alike. Categories are also a source of invisibility, as 
they exclude individuals who may participate informally in an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Giovanni Dosi, “Technological paradigms and technical trajectories: a suggested 
interpretation of the determinants and directions of technical change”, 22-2 
Research Policy (1982), pp.147 et sqq.  
14 Paul Pierson, Dismantling the welfare state? Reagan, Thatcher and the politics 
of retrenchment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
15 Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, An evolutionary theory of economic change 
(Cambridge, Ma: Belknap Press, 1982).!
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activity but are not officially accounted for (e.g. illegal farm workers 
or farmers’ spouses). Finally, the production of measures may 
sometimes average out extremes within the same category and prove 
meaningless. Hence, instead of a category, it can be sometimes be 
important to look for the existence of a group, with its own identity, 
values, set of rules and procedures. A precise understanding of a 
group’s structure and identity can help to assess the exposure of its 
members. Groups have different ways of acknowledging danger and 
dealing with it, linked to their structure and interest in maintaining 
their existence16 . Considering the existence of a group is also 
important because it may at some point become a collective actor 
intent on fighting for what it values. Aside from groups, analysing 
practices also implies understanding the reasons individuals have for 
behaving the way they do17. Based on the idea of limited rationality, 
it must be assumed that individuals make rational decisions, based on 
the amount of information available, the context they operate in, and 
the constraints they face 18 . To describe this rationality entails 
identifying an actor’s goals, interests, resources and constraints, the 
context he operates in, and his ways of making sense of the 
information he receives. These last two elements are particularly 
important when assessing risk objects. Individuals have to cope with 
informal rules and constraints if they want to be accepted in a group 
and their behaviour understood by others. Often times, what can be 
perceived from the outside as a deviant behaviour, or an irrational !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Mary Douglas, Risk and blame: essays in cultural theory (London: Routledge, 
2002).  
17 Raymond Boudon, Raison, bonnes raisons (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2003). 
18  Herbert C. Simon, Administrative behavior: a study of decision-making 
processes in administrative organization (New York: MacMillan, 1947).!
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decision, makes sense once it is positioned within a set of constraints 
and expectations. The ways in which individuals make sense of the 
information they receive must also be analyzed in terms of the 
groups they belong to, since these act as filters, conveying 
information that reinforces the group’s convictions, beliefs and 
values, blocking information that runs counter. But apart from 
groups, other mechanisms are at play when evaluating information, 
such as trust in the emitter, or the type of information emitted 
(abstract, neutral, general, or the opposite). All in all, this dimension 
stresses the importance of analyzing the contexts and groups that 
structure individual behaviours, in order to make sense of their 
practices when exposed to dangers and hazards. 
Problem construction: the trajectory from a given situation to its 
definition as a public problem is neither linear nor simple. Numerous 
situations that one could judge unacceptable never qualify as 
problems on the public agenda; whereas those that make it do not 
share any common properties. Hence, it is not so much the “why” 
that matters than the “how”: one must analyze the process that leads 
a situation to become an issue. Within this process, factors will help 
to understand how a situation became recognized as a public 
problem. This implies in the first place identifying the actors 
involved in converting a situation into a social problem, i.e. one that 
is judged unacceptable and calls for a remedy, and then into a public 
problem, i.e. one that justifies government intervention. Once the 
actors and their motives have been identified, their repertoires must 
be analyzed: what arguments do they use to make their case? What 
resources do they mobilize? In which arenas do they choose to 
intervene? Two key questions here are problem ownership and 
problem definition. Owning a problem allows to impose its 
definition: the nature of the problem, its causes and effects, who is 
2014/03 
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accountable, the solutions that are called for, and who should pay19. 
Defining a problem is never neutral; it is a contended process in 
which different stakeholders try to impose their conception. Problem 
ownership and definition must also be analyzed within specific 
public arenas (e.g. media, courts, parliament …), which have their 
own codes and procedures, for instance on how to formulate an 
argument or attract attention20. As public arenas have a limited 
carrying capacity, actors must struggle to impose their problems 
against other issues: once again, no objective characteristic can 
explain why some problems succeed and others fail to make it. 
Instead, one must analyze the strategies deployed by the problem 
owners and their capacity to adapt to the constraints of different 
arenas, in particular to format the problem’s definition in such a way 
as to capture the interests of those in charge of the arena (e.g. 
journalists, judges and lawyers, members of parliament …). Another 
strategy consists in building alliances with other issue holders; but 
this will imply adapting the problem definition to fit in a wider frame 
of contention. What the initial owners will lose in precision, they will 
gain in visibility and leverage. Hence, problem definition is an 
ongoing process, which continues well on after the issue has made it 
on the agenda as actors and groups continue to struggle to impose 
their solutions. 
Forms of knowledge: risk assessment rests on the mobilization of 
knowledge forms that need to be analyzed against their disciplinary 
backdrop. Each scientific discipline has its own way of ordering !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Joseph Gusfield, The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking, Driving and the 
Symbolic Order (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1981). 
20 Stephen Hilgartner and Charles Bosk “The rise and fall of social problems: a 
public arenas model”, 94-1 American Journal of Sociology 1988, pp. 53 et sqq.!
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reality, conducting experiments, producing evidence, validating its 
results, defining uncertainty; these must be accounted for when 
topics concern several disciplines that assess the risks differently. 
But disciplines also produce forms of invisibility, ignorance and 
uncertainty: it is now widely acknowledged that as knowledge 
progresses, so does ignorance21. The production of uncertainty can be 
unintentional: disciplines trace boundaries between the objects they 
purport to study and those they choose to discard, thus leaving the 
latter unknown; or methods to measure exposure can privilege high 
doses and accidental exposure, thus neglecting low doses over long 
periods of time22. But uncertainty can also be produced intentionally. 
In the US, an issue can be regulated only when the risk has been 
demonstrated and measured: accordingly, this has triggered a wide 
range of strategies by industrial actors to produce uncertainty in 
order to delay regulation23. In Europe, uncertainty can also be 
manufactured, but in this case to suggest action on the basis of the 
precautionary principle. Here actors will undertake to demonstrate 
that too many uncertainties remain around certain technologies to 
allow their diffusion, given their potential catastrophic and 
irreversible consequences 24 . In other words, the production of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Scott Frickel and M. Bess Vincent, “Katrina, Contamination, and the Unintended 
Organization of Ignorance”, 29 Technology in Society (2007), pp. 181 et sqq. 
Robert N. Proctor, “Agnotology: A Missing Term to Describe the Cultural 
Production of Ignorance (and Its Study)”, in Robert N. Proctor and Laura 
Schiebinger (ed.), Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 1 et sqq. 
22 Jean-Noel Jouzel, Des toxiques invisibles: sociologie d’une affaire sanitaire 
oubliée (Paris: Editions de l’Ehess, 2013). 
23 Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway, Merchants of doubt (New York : Bloomsbury 
Press, 2010).!
24 Olivier Borraz, Les politiques du risque (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2008). 
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uncertainty must be analysed critically. Finally, the reflection over 
forms of knowledge encompasses “lay knowledge”, i.e. various 
forms of knowledge produced by non-experts, using either 
conventional or non-conventional methods25. Although these forms 
of knowledge are often rejected in expert procedures, on the grounds 
that they have not gone through a standard process of validation, they 
tend to be more and more developed. Sometimes, these forms are 
based on the experience of individuals or groups. Other times, they 
are produced by groups who rely on some methods of observation, 
such as “popular epidemiology” 26 . Exposing and exploring the 
different knowledge forms can lead to a better assessment of the 
controversial nature of risk issues. 
Social inequalities: this theme is one of the strongest possible 
contributions of social sciences to risk analysis. In practice, this topic 
can be addressed in two ways, either by analyzing vertical 
inequalities in terms of social stratification (such as in the case of 
obesity, life expectancy or the incidence and prevalence of certain 
pathologies); or horizontally, by identifying specific groups of the 
population who are exposed to equally specific dangers (for instance, 
workers exposed to hazardous chemicals or communities living in 
contaminated areas). Although the former can be quantified and may 
seem more objective than the latter, both imply a reference to what is 
considered to be normal, acceptable or average. In other words, 
framing a situation in terms of inequality rests on a normative 
argument that mobilizes both objective characterizations and more or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Brian Wynne, “Misunderstood Misunderstanding: Social Identities and Public 
Uptake of Science”, 1-3 Public Understanding of Science (1992), pp. 281 et sqq. 
26 Phil Brown, “Popular Epidemiology: Community Response to Toxic Waste-
Induced Disease in Woburn, Massachusetts”, 12-3-4 Science, Technology, and 
Human Values (1987), pp. 76 et sqq.
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less implicit theories of social justice. It also requires forms of 
knowledge that will help “reveal” social inequalities, such as 
epidemiology, economics or social geography. Social inequalities 
can accordingly be addressed as a problem per se. But it can as well 
be viewed as a social aspect of wider considerations, when an issue 
tend to become highly controversial — or to remain on the contrary 
persistently ignored — because of its social distribution among the 
general population. And finally, even if claims can be heard, they 
will not always be acted upon: for instance, in countries such as 
France that put emphasis on equality of treatment by the law, 
revealing inequalities will not systematically lead to specific 
measures, since this would entail treating components of the entire 
population differently. In addition, while pointing to social 
inequalities can serve to politicize a risk object, such as in the case of 
environmental justice and racism27, stressing social inequalities can 
also justify a medicalisation of social issues, i.e. a form of 
depoliticisation28. In other words, framing an issue in terms of social 
inequalities is never neutral; its consequences need to be taken into 
account. 
 
IV. The checklist 
The checklist is not supposed to be applied systematically to all the 
referrals ANSES receives. The preliminary questions, though, should 
be applied as often as possible, in order to determine beforehand if a 
case requires special attention. These can be easily answered, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Stella M. Capek (1993), “The ‘environmental justice’ frame: a conceptual 
discussion and an application”, 40-1 Social Problems (1993), pp. 5 et sqq. 
28 Didier Fassin, L’espace politique de la santé (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1996).!
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from there the decision to answer the rest of the questionnaire will 
require a judgment of opportunity based on costs (namely time). 
Going through the preliminary questions and the questionnaire is also 
a learning process: the more it is undertaken on a regular basis, the 
more easily agents will identify rapidly key issues that need to be 
looked into more in depth. They will learn to work with the checklist, 
adapt it to their own needs, and integrate on a routine basis forms of 
questioning that are inspired by social sciences. This in turn should 
make it easier for them to turn, either to the social science unit or to 
outside social scientists, for additional help when answering a 
question requires time, special skills or research. 
The learning process also results from the fact that not one agent or 
expert should fill in the questionnaire on his own. It should be, as 
often as possible, a group activity, with staff and experts sharing 
information, and discussing together certain questions. And it should 
also be repeated during the entire referral process: although it will be 
undertaken at the outset, coming back to some questions later on can 
also prove useful, for instance in assessing the origins and validity of 
knowledge claims, the position of actors, or the behaviour of groups. 
Ultimately, the knowledge gathered should be an integral part of the 
final report, putting into context the risk assessment and management 
recommendations.  
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Preliminary Questions 
 
Is a large population exposed? Yes No 
Is the issue controversial or 
does it emerge in a context of 
social conflict? 
  
Could the situation undergo 
rapid changes? 
  
Is the reputation of ANSES at 
stake? 
  
Are there strong disagreements 
between the institutions 
concerned with the issue? 
  
Are highly sensitive economic 
or professional interests at 
stake? 
  
Is there insufficient knowledge 
regarding the practices of social 
groups concerned with the 
issue? 
  
Does the issue give rise to 
strong social movements in the 
public sphere? 
  
Is the issue characterized by 
persistent scientific 
uncertainties? 
  
Is the issue characterized by 
strong social inequalities? 
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Questionnaire 
 
1. Institutional Context 
1. Who addressed the referral to ANSES? On what grounds? How 
have the terms of the referral changed over time? What do the 
institutions concerned with the issue expect from ANSES? What is at 
stake for ANSES? 
2. What specific events led to the referral (crisis, accident, scientific 
publication, press release, new legal framework, court decision, 
stakeholder action...)? Does the issue hold any analogy with previous 
cases? 
3. Which institutions are concerned with the referral? Which 
ministries? public agencies? elected officials? local governments? 
international organizations? Does the issue have a specific history 
within the administration? Has the issue already been analyzed by 
foreign counterparts of ANSES?  
4. What are the specific interests of each institution? What are their 
views on the issue? What management options do they uphold?  
What relations do these institutions entertain between each other? 
5. In what legal framework do these institutions operate (local, 
national, European, global)? 
 
2. Socioeconomic context 
1. Who are the economic and professional actors involved? On what 
scale do they operate (local, national, international)? 
2. What is at stake for these actors as far as the referral is concerned? 
3. What type of relations prevails between these economic and 
professional actors (competition, cooperation, conflict)? How could 
these relations best be characterized: sectorial organization, market 
competition, firm integration, bipartite or tripartite negotiation …? 
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4. Are these relations stable or on the contrary rapidly evolving? If 
they are evolving, are the changes due to technological innovations, 
crises, regulatory reform, the emergence of new players? 
5. Has the issue ever been analyzed by economists? How are costs, 
benefits and risks shared and distributed among actors? 
 
3. Social practices and contexts 
1. Who are the social groups concerned with the issue? What is the 
approximate size of the population exposed? 
2. What are the social practices of the groups involved? Are these 
social practices similar or heterogeneous? 
3. What legal, economic, professional or cultural constraints shape 
these practices? 
4. What types of knowledge do social actors base their actions upon? 
5. Have these social practices ever been analyzed? 
 
4. Problem construction 
1. Beyond the institutional and economic actors identified, what 
other actors are concerned with the issue (citizen groups, NGOs, 
whistleblowers…)? What are their views on the issue? 
2. What are their privileged modes of operation (protest, petitions, 
legal action, media activism, cyberactivism…)? 
3. Could these social actors take part in the risk evaluation process in 
a relevant way? To what end? What would be the modus operandi of 
their participation? 
4. Are there competing definitions of the issue? Are the causes and 
consequences of the issue shared? In what arenas could these aspects 
be debated (courts, media, parliament, internet…)? 
5. Can alliances or conflicts among the different stakeholders be 
identified? Who are the most influential actors? 
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5. Forms of knowledge 
1. What are the main scientific disciplines and academic 
communities concerned with the issue? Are their respective 
approaches potentially divergent? 
2. Have social sciences already contributed to the production of 
knowledge on the issue (academic literature, conference proceedings, 
reports, specialized experts …)? 
3. Are some data or forms of knowledge produced by non-academic 
actors (public reports, professional groups, field data, citizen groups, 
activists, non-conventional knowledge …)? 
4. Are there serious uncertainties related to the issue? Are there 
divergent interpretations of these uncertainties? Are experts or actors 
actively involved in promoting these uncertainties? Are these 
uncertainties likely to remain over time?  
5. Is the existent knowledge contended? 
 
6. Social Inequalities 
1. How are costs, benefits and risks distributed within the 
population? Can significant differences be observed according to 
revenue, status, gender, age or geographical location? Is a 
characterization of the issue in terms of social inequalities relevant?  
2. What data can be used to characterize these social inequalities? 
3. Are there severely exposed or vulnerable populations (in terms of 
housing, migration, physical sensitiveness, cultural differences, 
handicap, loneliness…)? 
4. Which of these severely exposed or vulnerable populations are not 
represented in the public sphere? 
5. What would be the effects of government decisions under scrutiny 
on either the reduction or the increase of social inequalities? 
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V. Conclusion 
The checklist devised for ANSES is destined to promote and 
facilitate the use of social sciences in risk assessments. As agencies 
are confronted with ever more complex, ambiguous and uncertain 
issues, traditional methods of risk assessment are seen as limited and 
unsatisfactory: they fail to produce adequate results; they are 
contested in the face of growing evidence of low-dose, long-term 
effects of various substances and epigenetic phenomena; and they are 
perceived as too distanced from real-life situations. In this respect, 
the checklist enables to identify possible alternatives in terms of 
knowledge production, and to provide data on actual situations of 
exposure that are closer to the actual use of many substances.  
Agencies such as ANSES must also learn to deal with issues that will 
not go away29: while many experts may still be convinced that in the 
end, scientific evidence will contribute to close controversies over 
GM crops or nanotechnologies, more and more policymakers 
acknowledge that these controversies will never achieve closure. 
Hence their goal is to reach a form of stabilization, in order to avoid 
the controversy turning into a political scandal or a perpetual source 
of contention. In this respect, the checklist helps to identify key 
stakeholders, their interests and values, and to make sense of their 
knowledge claims. By integrating them in the process, it is possible 
to achieve some form of stabilization: they will continue to disagree, 
but their arguments and evidence will be taken into consideration 
instead of being left out.  
In turn, this calls for forms of expertise that are continuous, rather 
than punctual; and in which the different participants explore over !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Olivier Borraz, “From risk to the government of uncertainty: the case of mobile 
telephony”, 14-8 Journal of Risk Research (2011), pp. 969 et sqq!!
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time the different dimensions of complex, ambiguous and uncertain 
issues as they unfold. The checklist can be useful in organising this 
long-term process of exploration. 
Finally, as more and more groups and individuals seize situations of 
exposure to different dangers as opportunities to state claims, it is 
important for an agency such as ANSES to have the tools to analyze 
these phenomena and the procedures to manage such claims. 
The checklist also presents some limitations, which have already 
been mentioned.  
First, its success rests on its appropriation by agency staff and 
experts. Initial results show that this is possible, but not equally 
across ANSES. Some units are more open than others to such a line 
of enquiry. This is the case, unsurprisingly, of those that deal with 
complex, ambiguous and uncertain issues: they perceive in the 
checklist a way to reduce the uncertainty by integrating additional 
data, and to avoid a political scandal by anticipating controversial 
issues. Units that operate in domains that are more standardised and 
proceduralised see less of a benefit in introducing elements of 
information that have no added-value to their final decision or 
evaluation. But even in the case of units and services that see a 
potential benefit, three other limits can prevent them from filling in 
the checklist. 
Second, processing the checklist requires time and resources. This is 
an obvious disadvantage in any organisation that works under time 
pressure. This is all the more problematic in the current context of 
budget cuts, limited human resources, and a tendency by supervising 
ministries to inundate ANSES with multiple requests, for blame-
shifting purposes and to deter the agency from spending too much 
time on its own issues (in order to achieve greater independence). As 
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all services work under extreme pressure, they must be convinced 
that the time they invest now in the checklist can be won back later, 
for instance in avoiding a controversy or convincing stakeholders of 
the validity of the final report’s recommendations. This can only be 
done with a success story, i.e. a case demonstrating the usefulness of 
the checklist in improving the quality and robustness of the final 
report, while avoiding media hype, social controversies or political 
reactions. Such a success story has yet to be written. 
Third, the checklist will often render risk assessment more complex. 
By adding a whole new set of dimensions, it will reveal the initial 
problem’s embeddedness in an intricate structure of social, economic 
and political stakes and interests. Knowledge regarding these will not 
always be seen as relevant by agency staff and experts when they 
undertake to answer the referral; and often they will be right. But in 
some cases it will be necessary to add new dimensions to the 
problem’s initial framing, in order to make sense of elements that 
will determine the final report’s reception and impact. Adding these 
dimensions will set off a chain-reaction: this will require expertise 
that is not always available in the agency, cost time in finding the 
right experts, and request efforts to integrate the knowledge produced 
with the rest of the scientific data. In some cases, social science input 
will be perceived as controversial, as it points to the contrasted 
behaviour, values and interests of competing actors. In other words, 
going through the checklist will inevitably run the risk of adding 
uncertainties, ambiguities and complexities to an issue that may 
already have a substantial amount of these. Once again, only by 
demonstrating that this will ultimately result in a more robust report 
can this be seen as an acceptable risk.  
Fourth, the checklist does not easily fit in the process of risk analysis 
described by the NRC in 1983. The bulk of social science research 
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has underpinned the artificial nature of the boundary between risk 
assessment and risk management. While the authors of the 1983 
report stressed the need to articulate these two moments, European 
authorities have often opted for a rigid separation – resting on the 
belief that science and society are clearly delineated. Yet most social 
scientists agree that such a boundary is a social construction and 
moreover does not withstand a close scrutiny of the behaviour of 
experts and policymakers alike. The questionnaire itself was 
established on the conviction that such a separation is essentially a 
myth. And clearly, going through the checklist will lead to question 
this distinction, thus potentially creating uneasiness among some 
staff and experts who still believe strongly in the distinct nature of 
their work; as opposed to the more political nature of the decisions 
made by risk managers. And even when agency staff and experts 
have come to accept the ambiguous nature of the distinction between 
science and society, they continue to rely upon it as a frame of 
reference for their activity. In other words, the use of the checklist 
runs the risk of undermining key features of the risk analysis process.  
In conclusion, the pragmatic nature of this checklist must be stressed. 
Far from a generic, one-size-fits-all tool, derived from sociological 
theories and destined to assess all types of risks, it is a tool adapted to 
ANSES’ needs and destined to answer these with knowledge 
available in the social sciences. Its success rests ultimately on the 
firm belief by agency staff and experts that introducing social 
sciences in their risk assessments will significantly improve the 
quality and robustness of their advice to policymakers. 
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